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The Deconstitutionalization of Education
Erwin Chemerinsky*
I. INTRODUCTION
Fifty years ago, in Brown v. Board of Education,' Chief Justice Earl
Warren eloquently proclaimed the importance of education. He wrote:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in
the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is
doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life
if he is denied the opportunity of an education. 2
Brown offered the promise that the federal courts would recognize a
fundamental right to education and use the Constitution to ensure equal
educational opportunity for all children in the United States.3  In my
opinion, the simple reality is that without judicial action equal
educational opportunity will never exist. There is no powerful political
constituency for equalizing educational opportunities for children who
are poor or are part of racial minority groups. 4  For decades, no
President has addressed the problem of school segregation.5 Nor is it
* Alston & Bird Professor of Law, Duke Law School.
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Id. at 493.
3. See id. at 495 (holding that segregation in public education deprives students of the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment).
4. See Top 20 PAC Contributors to Federal Candidates, 2003-2004, at
http://usgovinfo.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?zi= I/XJ&sdn=usgovinfo&zu=http%3A%2F%
2Fwww.opensecrets.org%2Fpacs%2Ftopacs.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2004) (showing that
industry lobbyists, trial lawyers, labor unions, and corporations are the heaviest political action
committee contributors).
5. Perhaps the most significant presidential act in recent memory was President Dwight D.
Eisenhower's dispatch of the United States Army, including the 101st Airborne Division, to Little
Rock, Arkansas, to enforce desegregation in the 1950s. See Stephen Ambrose, Dwight D.
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possible to think of many state or local politicians who have made an
issue of separate and unequal schools. Any systematic attempt to deal
with education would be highly unpopular; transferring money and
students from wealthy areas to poorer areas is sure to engender
enormous opposition. Those with the most influence in the political
system can opt out of city public schools, by living in suburbs or
sending their children to private schools. 6
The result is that if the courts do not equalize educational
opportunity, no one will. Yet, the reality is that for over thirty years,
with the exception of largely disastrous and unsuccessful court-ordered
busing, the Supreme Court, and the lower federal courts, have done
nothing to advance desegregation of schools or to equalize expenditures
for education. 7
In fact, the Supreme Court's overall approach has been to withdraw
the courts from involvement in American schools. I term this withdrawl
the "deconstitutionalization of education." In numerous decisions,
involving many different kinds of claims, the Supreme Court has
professed almost unlimited deference to school officials and has refused
to apply the Constitution in schools. 8  The Court's abdication of
responsibility for school desegregation and for equalizing educational
opportunity must be understood as part of this larger pattern of the
deconstitutionalization of education.9
My goal in this article is to describe and criticize the
deconstitutionalization of education. Part II of this article seeks to show
how the Supreme Court has withdrawn the judiciary from enforcing the
Eisenhower 1953-1961, in CHARACTER ABOVE ALL: TEN PRESIDENTS FROM FDR TO GEORGE
BUSH 74-75 (Robert A. Wilson ed., 1995) (describing how President Eisenhower sent American
troops into Little Rock, Arkansas to enforce the implementation of Brown).
6. In the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, much was made of the private prep-school
backgrounds of Al Gore, George W. Bush, and John Kerry, all sons of wealthy public servants.
7. The Supreme Court upheld court-ordered busing in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), but the federal courts have done little in the way of addressing
school funding disparities. However, there have been some such efforts in state courts. See, e.g.,
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 398-99 (Tex. 1989) (finding the Texas
school funding scheme unconstitutional and requiring the state legislature to take "immediate
action"). The resulting "Robin Hood" style funding plans, in which richer districts provide
money to poorer districts, have been very controversial, unpopular, and recently, targeted for
termination by lawmakers. April Castro, Lawmakers Propose End to Robin Hood School
Funding, AMARILLO GLOBE-NEWS, Jan. 31, 2003, at
http://www.amarillonet.com/stories/013103/tex_ robinhood.shtml (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
8. See infra notes 111-1158 and accompanying text (discussing Hazelwood, Bethel, T.L.O.,
Vernonia, Goss, and Ingraham).
9. The focus of this paper is exclusively on elementary and secondary schools. Thus, I am not
considering the issue of affirmative action in colleges and universities.
The Deconstitutionalization of Education
Constitution in public schools. 10  Part III argues why the
deconstitutionalization of education is undesirable and why judicial
action, through the Constitution, is imperative to deal with the problems
in American public schools." Thus, this article is both descriptive,
detailing the Court's abdication of responsibility for the constitutional
rights of students, and normative, arguing that this is undesirable.
II. DECONSTITUTIONALIZATION HAS OCCURRED
What is striking and has been overlooked is that the Supreme Court's
failure to enforce equal protection in the school context is part of its
overall refusal to enforce any parts of the Constitution when it comes to
public schools. 12 In this section, I look at several examples, beginning
with desegregation and then considering school funding, free speech
rights for students, and searches of students. In every area, the result is
the same: The Supreme Court has ruled in favor of school autonomy
and refused to enforce constitutional limits to improve the quality of
education.1 3
A. Desegregation
A recent study by Harvard Professor Gary Orfield carefully
documents that during the 1990s America's public schools became
substantially more segregated. 14  In the South, for example, he shows
10. See infra Part II (describing and criticizing the deconstitutionalization of education). I do
not want to overstate my descriptive thesis. There are some isolated areas where the courts have
continued to enforce the Constitution in schools. The notable example is in preventing prayer in
public schools. See notes 159-61 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's consistent
holding that prayer in public schools violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment).
But as described below, this is very much the exception in an overall pattern of judicial refusal to
enforce the Constitution when it comes to education.
11. See infra Part III (describing recent Supreme Court decisions as deconstitutionalizing
because they: (1) abdicate responsibility for enforcing the Constitution in schools; and (2) have
consequent, detrimental effects).
12. See infra Part II.C (discussing the theory that the Supreme Court's failure to enforce equal
protection reflects a larger failure of the judiciary to enforce the Constitution in schools and
noting that First Amendment free speech cases are a compelling example).
13. See infra Part II.C-D (discussing the Supreme Court's high level of deference to school
administrators in the areas of First Amendment free speech cases and Fourth Amendment cases).
14. GARY ORFIELD, SCHOOLS MORE SEPARATE: CONSEQUENCES OF A DECADE OF
RESEGREGATION 2 (2001). See also THE CENTURY FOUNDATION TASKFORCE ON THE COMMON
SCHOOL, DIVIDED WE FAIL: COMING TOGETHER THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 17 (2002)
[hereinafter CENTURY FOUNDATION] (noting that more than seventy percent of black students
attend "mostly minority schools," as do seventy-six percent of Latinos); David Waters, School
Resegregation the Result of Law That Can't Be Repealed, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, at
http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:UinOmXOJTf8J:www.thesunlink.com/shns/story.cfm%3F
pk%3DFAITH-FA1TH-05-12-04%26cat%3DLR+%22resegregation+of+schools%22&hl=en (last
visited Nov. 6, 2004) (noting that in Memphis, Tennessee, 84 of the 185 public schools in the city
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that "[firom 1988 to 1998, most of the progress of the previous two
decades in increasing integration in the region was lost. The South is
still more integrated than it was before the civil rights revolution, but it
is moving backward at an accelerating rate." 15
The statistics presented in Professor Orfield's study are stark. For
example, the percentage of African-American students attending
majority white schools has steadily decreased since 1988.16 In 1954, at
the time of Brown v. Board of Education, only 0.001% of African-
American students in the South attended majority white schools. 17 In
1964, a decade after Brown, it was just 2.3%.18 From 1964 to 1988,
there was significant progress: from 13.9% in 1967, to 23.4% in 1968,
to 37.6% in 1976, to 42.9% in 1986, and this percentage rose steadily to
43.5% in 1988.'9 But since 1988, the percentage of African-American
students attending majority white schools has gone in the opposite
direction. 20 By 1991, the percentage of African-American students
attending majority white schools in the South had decreased to 39.2%
and over the course of the 1990s it went to 36.6% in 1994, to 34.7% in
1996, and to 32.7% by 1998.21
Professor Orfield shows that nationally the percentage of African-
American students attending majority black schools and schools where
over 90% of the students are minorities also has increased since 1995.22
In 1986, 63.3% of black students attended schools that were fifty to one
hundred percent comprised of minority students; by 1998-99, 70.2% of
black students were attending schools that were 50 to 100% minority. 23
In North Carolina the same pattern exists. Between 1993, the number
of schools with minority enrollments of eighty percent or more
doubled.24 In Charlotte, fewer than sixty percent of the schools are
racially diverse, down from eighty-five percent in the 1980s. 25
are ninety to one hundred percent African-American even though thirty-five percent of the city
population is white).
15. ORFIELD, supra note 14, at 2.
16. Id. at 29.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 31.
23. Id.
24. Tim Simmon & Susan Ebbs, Separate and Unequal Again, THE NEWS AND OBSERVER,
Feb. 18, 2001, at Al, available at http://www.newsdoserver.com/news/education/
gap/reseg/story/1236445p-7346051 c.html.
25. Id.
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Quite significantly, Professor Orfield shows that the same is true for
Latino students. The historic focus for desegregation efforts has been to
integrate African-American and white students. The burgeoning Latino
population requires that desegregation focus on this racial minority as
well. The percentage of Latino students attending schools where the
majority of students are of minority races, or almost exclusively of
minority races, increased steadily over the 1990s. 26  Professor Orfield
notes that "[Latinos] have been more segregated than blacks for a
number of years, not only by race and ethnicity but also by poverty."
27
And there is every reason to believe that the problem is going to get
worse. A significant cause of the predicament is that Supreme Court
decisions ending successful desegregation orders are causing substantial
increases in segregation. 28  In several cases, the Supreme Court
concluded that school systems had achieved "unitary" status and thus
that federal court desegregation efforts were to end.29  The result was
that remedies, which were in place and working, ended and
resegregation resulted. Many lower courts followed the lead of the
Supreme Court and likewise ended desegregation orders. 30  The result
has been predictable: the increase in resegregation which Professor
Orfield documents.
31
In several recent cases, the Supreme Court has considered when a
federal court should terminate a desegregation order. 32  In 1991, in
26. ORFIELD, supra note 14, at 31. See also CENTURY FOUNDATION, supra note 14, at 17
(discussing segregation of Latino students in public schools).
27. ORFIELD, supra note 14, at 2.
28. Id. at 16 (noting the Rehnquist Court's consistent dissents against school desegregation
law); see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100 (1995) (holding that normative measures
designed to attract non-minority students and teachers into the Kansas City School District were
beyond the scope of the Court's remedial authority); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 471 (1992)
(holding that the District Court did not have to supervise remedial measures to correct racial
imbalances); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247 (1991) (holding that the school district
did not have to show grievous wrong in order to dissolve desegregation and that once a "unitary"
system had been achieved, an earlier desegregation order should end).
29. See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 100, 102 (holding that the district court's "desegregative
attractiveness" plan exceeded its authority and remanding with instructions to the district court to
consider that many of the goals of the education plan had been met and that the school system
was operating in compliance with the Constitution); Dowell, 498 U.S. at 244 (upholding the
district court's determination that the Oklahoma City school system had achieved unitary status
and reversing the appellate court's holding that the Board had an affirmative duty not to impede
the process of dismantling the dual system).
30. See, e.g., People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 246 F.3d 1073, 1075, 1078 (7th Cir.
2001) (observing that the Rockford schools are less segregated than any previous case in which a
school system was declared unitary and terminating the consent decree in effect).
31. ORFIELD, supra note 14, at 31.
32. See infra notes 33-60 (discussing the Dowell, Pitts, and Jenkins cases).
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Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, the issue was whether
a desegregation order, which had been terminated in 1977, should be
reinstated when respondents contended that the district's new plan
would mean a resegregation of the public schools.33 Oklahoma schools
had been segregated according to state law until 1972-eighteen years
after Brown.34  In 1972, however, a federal court successfully
desegregated the Oklahoma City public schools.35 Evidence proved that
ending the desegregation order would result in dramatic resegregation.36
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that once a "unitary" school
system had been achieved, a federal court's desegregation order should
end even if it will mean resegregation of the schools. 37
The Court, however, did not define "unitary system" with any
specificity. The Court simply said that courts should end desegregation
decrees if the school board "has complied in good faith" and "the
vestiges of past discrimination have been eliminated to the extent
practicable." 38 The Court said that in evaluating this "the District Court
should look not only at student assignments, but 'to every facet of
school operations- faculty, staff, transportation, extra-curricular
activities and facilities. " 39
In Freeman v. Pitts, the Supreme Court held that a federal court
desegregation order should end when schools have complied with that
particular order, even if other desegregation orders for the same school
system remain in place. 4° A federal district court ordered desegregation
of various aspects of a school system in Georgia that previously had
been segregated by law.41 Part of the desegregation plan had been met;
the school system had achieved desegregation in pupil assignment and
facilities. 42  Another aspect of the desegregation order, concerning
assignment of teachers, had not yet been fulfilled.43 After partially
complying with the desegregation order, the school system planned to
construct a facility that likely would benefit whites more than African-
Americans. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that the federal court
33. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 240-44 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 251.
35. See Dowell v. Bd. of Educ., 338 F. Supp. 1256, 1268-71 (W.D. Okla. 1972) (ordering
desegregation under a court-imposed plan).
36. Dowell v. Bd. of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483, 1487-88 (10th Cir. 1989).
37. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 244-46.
38. Id. at 249-50.
39. Id. at 250 (citations omitted).
40. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,471 (1992).
41. Pitts v. Freeman, 755 F.2d 1423, 1424 (11th Cir. 1985).
42. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 474.
43. Id. at 473.
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could not review the discriminatory effects of the new construction
because the part of the desegregation order concerning facilities had
already been met.44  The Court said that once a portion of a
desegregation order is met, the federal court should cease its efforts as
to that part and retain involvement only as to those aspects of the plan
that have not been achieved.45
Finally, in Missouri v. Jenkins, the Court ordered an end to a school
desegregation order for the Kansas City schools.4 6  Missouri law once
required the racial segregation of all public schools.47 It was not until
1977 that a federal district court ordered the desegregation of the
Kansas City, Missouri public schools. 48  The federal court's
desegregation effort made a difference. In 1983, twenty-four schools in
the district had an African-American enrollment of more than ninety
percent.49 By 1993, no elementary-level student attended a school with
an enrollment that was ninety percent or more African-American. 50  At
the middle school and high school levels, the percentage of students
attending schools with an African-American enrollment of ninety
percent or more declined from about forty-five percent to twenty-two
percent.51
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, ruled in favor of
the state on every issue. 52 There were three parts to the Court's holding.
First, the Court ruled that the district court's order, which attempted to
attract non-minority students from outside the district, was
impermissible because there was no proof of an inter-district violation.
53
44. Id. at 485.
45. ld. at 490-91.
46. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). Earlier in Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51
(1990), the Supreme Court ruled that a federal district court could order that a local taxing body
increase taxes to pay for compliance with a desegregation order, although the federal court should
not itself order an increase in the taxes.
47. The Missouri Constitution originally provided for "separate free public schools... [for]
children of African descent." MO. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (1875). The section was a part of
Missouri's current constitution until repealed by special election in 1976. MO. CONST. art. IX, §
1(a) (1945). Additionally, a Missouri statute prohibited "any colored child to attend any white
school, or for any white child to attend a colored school." Mo. REV. STAT. § 9216 (1929). The
statute was later recodified at Mo. REV. STAT. § 163.130 (1949) and repealed by 1957 Mo. Laws
452 § 1.
48. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 74.
49. Id. at 115 (Thomas, J., concurring).
50. Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate and Unequal: American Public Education Today, 52 AM L.
REV. 1461, 1466 (2003).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 94, 100.
53. Id. at 90-92, 94.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, applied Milliken v. Bradley to
conclude that the inter-district remedy-incentives to attract students
from outside the district into the Kansas City schools-was
impermissible because there was only proof of an intra-district
violation. 54  The social reality, however, is that many city school
systems are now primarily comprised of minority students, while
surrounding suburban school districts are almost all white.55 Thus,
effective desegregation requires an inter-district remedy.
Second, the Court ruled that the district court lacked authority to
order an increase in teacher salaries. 56 Although the district court
believed that an across-the-board salary increase to attract teachers was
essential for desegregation, the Supreme Court concluded that it was not
necessary as a remedy. 57  In my view, this further limited the federal
courts' remedial authority in dealing with the legacy of discrimination.
Finally, the Court ruled that the continued disparity in student test
scores did not justify continuance of the federal court's desegregation
order.58  The Court concluded that the Constitution requires equal
opportunity, not any result, and therefore disparities between African-
American and white students on standardized tests were not a sufficient
basis for concluding that desegregation had not been achieved.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that once a school complies with a
desegregation order, the federal court effort should be ended. 59  The
Court held that disparity in test scores is not a basis for continued
federal court involvement. 60
Together, the three cases have given a clear signal to lower courts:
The time has come to end desegregation orders, even when the effect
will be resegregation. Lower courts have followed this lead. 61  The
54. Id. at 93-94 (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974)).
55. See id. at 93 (citing Milliken, 418 U.S. at 735, in which the lower court found that any less
comprehensive a solution than a metropolitan area plan would result in an all African-American
school system immediately surrounded by practically all white suburban school systems).
56. Id. at 100.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 89 (holding that the "ultimate inquiry" is whether the school has "complied in good
faith with the desegregation decree").
60. Id. at 101.
61. Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453, 456 (6th Cir. 1999) (affirming a lower court decision that
modified a school desegregation consent decree and terminated judicial supervision of student
school assignments primarily because the district had achieved partial unitary status as to student
assignments); Hull v. Quitman County Bd. of Educ., I F.3d 1450, 1453-55 (5th Cir. 1993)
(noting that a remedy to de jure segregation has been eliminating unconstitutional school
segregation patterns and concluding that the Quitman County School Board had no duty to keep
one school open in order to maintain a partially integrated school housing fewer than seven
[Vol. 36
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United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has ended the
desegregation remedy for the Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools. 62  The
Eleventh Circuit ended the desegregation order for the Hillsborough
County schools in Tampa, Florida.63 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the
district court's conclusion that unitary status had not been reached. 64
Notwithstanding the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion, at thirteen
Hillsborough schools Latino students outnumber whites and African-
Americans combined.65 A recent article in the National Law Journal
describes the end of desegregation orders throughout the country and
quotes education expert Gary Orfield: "We're going back to a kind of
Plessy separate-but-equal world. I blame the courts. Because the courts
are responsible for the resegregation of the South. '66 The federal courts
are withdrawing from overseeing school desegregation; it is an area of
profound deconstitutionalization.
B. School Funding
By the 1970s, it also was clear that there were substantial disparities
in school funding. In 1972, education expert Christopher Jencks
estimated that on average, fifteen to twenty percent more was being
spent on each white student's education than on each African-American
child's schooling throughout the country. 67  For example, the Chicago
public schools, where 45.5% of the students were white and 39.1% were
African-American, spent $5,265 for each student's education; but in the
Niles school system, just north of the city, where 91.6% of the students
percent of the district's students); Tasby v. Moses, 265 F. Supp. 2d 757, 764, 780-81 (N.D. Tex.
2003) (dissolving a desegregation order because the school district achieved unitary status); Little
Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1089 (E.D. Ark. 2002)
(partially declaring unitary status because of the Little Rock School District's compliance with a
desegregation order in the areas of good faith, student discipline, extracurricular activities,
advanced placement courses, and guidance counseling); Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 370 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (ordering desegregation in part because of the
school district's good faith compliance with the desegregation decree for the previous twenty
years).
62. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 311 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
63. Manning v. Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 927, 929 (11th Cir. 2001).
64. Id.
65. Marilyn Brown, Beyond Black and White, TAMPA TRIB., Feb. 10, 2000, at Al.
66. Tresa Baldas, Saying Goodbye to Desegregation Plans, NAT'L L. J., June 16, 2003, at 4.
Of course, the Midwest and North has by no means been a model for desegregation itself, given
its own patterns of segregated schools and neighborhoods. See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY
& NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE
UNDERCLASS (1993) (detailing how racial segregation is a persisting reality and is perpetuating
urban poverty, which ultimately has led to a separate-but-equal environment).
67. CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF FAMILY AND
SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 28 (1972).
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were white and 0.4% African-American, $9,371 was spent on each
student's schooling.68  Similarly, in mostly African-American Camden,
New Jersey, $3,538 was spent on each pupil; but in mostly white
Princeton, New Jersey, $7,725 was spent.69
There, of course, is a simple explanation for the disparities in school
funding. In most states, education is substantially funded by local
property taxes.7° Wealthier suburbs have significantly larger tax bases
than poor inner cities.71 The result is that suburbs can tax at a low rate
and still have a great deal to spend on education. 72 Cities must tax at a
higher rate and nonetheless have less to spend.73
68. JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES app. at 236 (1991).
69. Id.
70. JAMES A. KUSHNER, APARTHEID IN AMERICA: A HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF
CONTEMPORARY RACIAL RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES 59-60 (1980).
Kushner observed:
The real property tax is the primary source of funding for schools and municipal
services. Ad valorem property taxes, based on the assessed valuation of land plus
improvements, have been a major catalyst fostering urban decay. Tax-ratable
commercial and industrial land uses contribute a large amount of revenue in proportion
to their low demand for services; while their suburban relocation has left the residents
of the deteriorating housing market without the means to pay for their expensive
welfare and educational services. The central city government is placed in an untenable
position as assessed property valuations decline in inverse proportion to escalating
demand for services. This results in a continually increasing tax burden on the
remaining residents to sustain their welfare, educational requirements and community
services.
Id.; see also Lauren A. Wetzler, Comment, Buying Equality: How School Finance Reform and
Desegregation Came to Compete in Connecticut, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 481, 485 (2004)
(discussing how Connecticut relies heavily on property taxes to fund education which results in
wealthy towns having unequal school district expenditures).
71. See Marion Crain, Colorblind Unionism, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1313, 1319 (2002)
(recognizing that "educational opportunities are linked to property values, because school budgets
are financed through local property taxes").
72. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part l-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 346, 422 (1990) (observing that wealthier communities have higher levels of property
wealth and can therefore tax at lower rates yet generate substantially more revenue than urban
communities); Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and the
New Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REV. 93, 147 n.203 (2003) (reasoning that the "federal tax
treatment of local property taxes produces a huge indirect subsidy for wealthy districts").
73. See Briffault, supra note 72, at 422 (noting that poorer communities tax at much higher
rates than wealthier communities but have comparatively low levels of school spending); see also
Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (N.J. 1990) (finding the state's Public School Education Act
unconstitutional as applied to the poor urban school districts). Specifically, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, in Abbott, found:
[T]he poorer the district and the greater its need, the less the money available, and the
worse the education. That system is neither thorough nor efficient. We hold the [Public
School Education] Act unconstitutional as applied to poorer urban school districts.
Education has failed there, for both the students and the State. We hold that the Act
must be amended to assure funding of education in poorer urban districts at the level of
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The Court had the opportunity to remedy this inequality in education
in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.74 But the
Court profoundly failed and concluded that the inequalities in funding
did not deny equal protection. 75 Rodriguez involved a challenge to the
Texas system of funding public schools largely through local property
taxes. 76 The Texas financing system meant that poor areas had to tax at
a high rate, but had little to spend on education while wealthier areas
could tax at lower rates, but still had much more to spend on
education. 77 For example, one poorer district spent $356 per pupil,
while a wealthier district spent $594 per student.78
The plaintiffs challenged this system on two equal protection
grounds: (1) it violated equal protection as impermissible wealth
discrimination; and (2) it denied children from the poor areas the
fundamental right to education. 79  The Court rejected the former
argument by holding that poverty is not a suspect classification, and
therefore discrimination against the poor only need meet rational basis
review. 80  Moreover, the Court rejected the claim that education is a
fundamental right.81 The Court said:
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional
rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. Thus,
the key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is not to be
found in comparisons of the relative societal significance of education
as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by
weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel.
property-rich districts; that such funding cannot be allowed to depend on the ability of
local school districts to tax; that such funding must be guaranteed and mandated by the
State; and that the level of funding must also be adequate to provide for the special
educational needs of these poorer urban districts in order to redress their extreme
disadvantages.
Id.
74. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
75. See id. at 50-51 (concluding that "the existence of some inequality in the manner in which
the state's rationale is achieved is not alone a sufficient basis for striking down the entire system"
(internal quotations omitted)).
76. Id. at 4-5, 10.
77. Id. at 11-13. The poorest school district was taxed at a rate of $1.05 per $100,000
assessed value to contribute a total of $26 per student in tax revenues. Id. at 12. On the other
hand, the wealthiest district was taxed at a rate of only $0.85 per $100,000, but still contributed
more than $300 per student. Id. at 13.
78. Id. at 12-13.
79. Id. at 19, 29.
80. Id. at 28.
81. Id. at 37. See also id. at 29-30 (discussing the Court's reasoning that although providing
education is an important state service, that importance alone "does not determine whether it must
be regarded as fundamental for purposes of an examination under the Equal Protection Clause").
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Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to
education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.
82
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, then concluded: "Education, of
course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our
Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is
implicitly so protected.- 83 Although education obviously is inextricably
linked to the exercise of constitutional rights such as freedom of speech
and voting, the Court nonetheless decided that education, itself, is not a
fundamental right. 84  Applying the rational relationship test, the Court
said:
[T]he logical limitations on appellees' nexus theory are difficult to
perceive. How, for instance, is education to be distinguished from the
significant personal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter?
Empirical examination might well buttress an assumption that the ill-
fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among the most ineffective
participants in the political process, and that they derive the least
enjoyment from the benefits of the First Amendment. 85
The Court also noted that the government did not completely deny an
education to students; the challenge was to inequities in funding.86 The
Court concluded that strict scrutiny was inappropriate because there was
neither discrimination based on a suspect classification nor infringement
of a fundamental right.87 The Court thus found that the Texas system
for funding schools through local property taxes met the rational basis
test. 88
The Court reaffirmed that education is not a fundamental right under
the Equal Protection Clause in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools.89
When a poor family challenged a state law authorizing local school
systems to charge a fee for use of school buses, 90 the Court again
82. Id. at 33.
83. Id. at 35.
84. Id. at 37.
85. Id. (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 38-39. The opinion reasoned that by adopting a method to finance public education,
the state was extending the reach of education to more residents. Id. Therefore, the plan "should
be scrutinized under judicial principles sensitive to the nature of the State's efforts." Id. at 39.
87. Id. at 37, 40.
88. Id. at 55. The Court began its rational basis analysis by noting that the Texas system was
entitled to a presumption of validity. Id. It then emphasized the fact that the system was based
on "responsible studies conducted by qualified people." Id. The Court also recognized that
property tax-financed public education previously had the support of most local governments and
explained that it was "unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of wisdom superior to that of
legislators, scholars, and educational authorities in 50 states." Id.
89. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450 (1988).
90. Id. at 454. The state law at issue allowed certain school districts to recover transportation
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reiterated that poverty is not a suspect classification, that education is
not a fundamental right, and that discrimination against the poor only
has to meet rational basis review. 91 The Court said that education was
not denied because the fee did not preclude the student from attending
school.92 Hence, the Court said that rational basis review was
appropriate 93 and concluded that the plaintiffs "failed to carry the
'heavy burden' of demonstrating that the challenged statute is arbitrary
and irrational. 94
These decisions are wrong-tragically wrong-in holding that there
is not a fundamental right to education. Education is essential for the
exercise of constitutional rights, for economic opportunity, and
ultimately for achieving equality. 95 Almost three decades after Brown,
in Plyler v. Doe, Justice Brennan writing for the majority reiterated the
vital importance of public education:
Public education is not a "right" granted to individuals by the
Constitution. But neither is it merely some governmental "benefit"
indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation. Both
the importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and
the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the
distinction .... [E]ducation provides the basic tools by which
individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of
us all. In sum, education has a fundamental role in maintaining the
fabric of our society. 96
Rodriguez and Kadrmas were enormously important steps in the
deconstitutionalization of education because they made it clear that
American public education is characterized by poor, African-American
city schools surrounded by wealthy, white suburban schools spending a
great deal more on education. 97  As discussed below, however, the
federal Constitution does not address this predicament and the federal
costs by charging user fees. Id. The fees could recover the total charge to the district. Id.
91. Id. at 458.
92. Id. at 460-61 (distinguishing the program at issue, which only impacted one of a number
of transportation alternatives, from other programs that barred the only available alternative and
consequently prohibited participation altogether).
93. Id. at 461-62.
94. Id. at 463 (citation omitted).
95. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (stressing the importance of
education in American society as the foundation of good citizenship).
96. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (internal citations omitted).
97. See generally JAMES T. PATrERSON, BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY (2001) (tracing the developments in desegregation
since Brown and focusing on the impact of significant Supreme Court decisions in those
developments).
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courts offer no remedy to the problem via greater protections. 98
C. Freedom of Speech
My thesis is that the Court's failure to enforce equal protection in
education must be understood as part of a larger failure on the part of
the judiciary to enforce the Constitution when it comes to schools. The
First Amendment and the free speech rights of students are a powerful
example of this.99
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District was
the high watermark of the Supreme Court protecting the constitutional
rights of students.'°° The decision is perhaps best remembered for its
ringing pronouncement: "It can hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate." 101  This sentence powerfully
conveys that schools are not institutions immune from constitutional
scrutiny.
Tinker was decided in 1969, the last year of the Warren Court. Chief
Justice Earl Warren had already announced his resignation and was
soon to be replaced by the much more conservative Warren Burger.
10 2
The author of the majority opinion in Tinker, Justice Abe Fortas,
already had been denied confirmation as Chief Justice when Tinker was
released, and Justice Fortas would shortly resign from the Court amidst
a scandal. 10 3 Justice Fortas's successor, Justice Harry Blackmun, would
98. See infra Part II.C (discussing the Court's failure to enforce the freedom of speech rights
of students); Part 1I.D (discussing the Court's failure to enforce the Fourth Amendment rights of
students).
99. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend.
I; see infra notes 108-131 and accompanying text (discussing how the Court limited student
rights under the First and Fourth Amendments in Bethel and Kuhlmeier, respectively).
100. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The challenged
policy in Tinker prohibited students from wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War.
Id. at 504. First, the Court found that wearing armbands in protest was a constitutionally
protected form of free speech. Id. at 505-06. Then, the Court found that because the school
failed to demonstrate that the prohibition served to prevent substantial disruption of school
activities, it unconstitutionally prohibited protected speech. Id. at 514.
101. ld.at506.
102. Chief Justice Warren actually resigned before the 1968 election in the failed hope that
President Lyndon Johnson would appoint a liberal successor. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT
ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 10 (1979). The result was that when Nixon took office in January
1969, he already had Warren's letter of resignation and was free to appoint a conservative judge.
Id. In June 1969, the Senate confirmed Warren Burger, a conservative Court of Appeals judge for
the District Of Columbia, as Chief Justice. Id. at 11, 24.
103. Justice Fortas was considered a crony of President Johnson, and his nomination for Chief
Justice was rejected by the Senate. Id. at 10. Justice Fortas resigned from the Supreme Court
following disclosure that he had accepted $20,000 from an industrialist who bragged that Justice
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be a strong conservative voice and a consistent conservative vote in his
first years on the Court. 1
04
Over the three decades of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, there
have been virtually no decisions protecting rights of students in schools.
Indeed, there have been remarkably few rulings concerning students'
speech, despite hundreds of lower court decisions on the topic.
Excluding cases concerning religious expression, there have been only
two Supreme Court cases concerning student speech in elementary,
middle schools, and high schools: Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser10 5 and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.10 6  In both, the
Court rejected the students' First Amendment claims and sided with the
schools. 107
In Bethel, the Court upheld the punishment of a student for a speech
given at a school assembly, in which the student nominated another
student for a position in student government by giving a speech filled
with sexual innuendos. 10 8 The school suspended the student speaker for
a few days and kept him from speaking at his graduation as
scheduled.' 09
In upholding the punishment, the Supreme Court emphasized the
need for judicial deference to educational institutions. °10 Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the Court, said that "[t]he determination of what
manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is
inappropriate properly rests with the school board.""' The Court also
distinguished Tinker on the ground that it had involved political speech,
Fortas would help him with a pending investigation against him by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Id. at 18. Wolfson, the industrialist, was convicted and Justice Fortas returned the
money in secret. Id. Justice Fortas resigned in May 1969 as a result of the scandal. Id. at 20.
104. See id. at 122 (noting that the conservatives, Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger,
were on opposing sides of Supreme Court opinions in only two of their first fifty cases together).
105. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
106. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
107. Id. at 266 (asserting that students can lose constitutional protections to free speech if
"school authorities have reason to believe that such expression will 'substantially interfere with
the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students"'); Bethel, 478 U.S. at 681
(stating that "'fundamental values' must also take into account consideration of the sensibilities
of others, and, in the case of a school, the sensibilities of fellow students").
108. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 677-78.
109. Id. at 678.
110. Id. at 686-87.
Ill. See id. at 680-82. The Court recognized the Tinker holding that students do not lose
constitutional protections just by entering school. Id. at 680. "It does not follow, however, that
simply because the use of an offensive speaker considers a political point, the same latitude must
be permitted to children in a public school." Id. at 682.
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whereas the expression in Bethel was sexual in nature."I2 Chief Justice
Burger said that "it is a highly appropriate function of public school
education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public
discourse.""11 3  He concluded that "[a] high school assembly or
classroom is no place for a sexually explicit monologue. .. [and] it was
perfectly appropriate for the school to disassociate itself to make the
point to the pupils that vulgar speech. .. is wholly inconsistent with the
'fundamental values' of public school education." 114
The Court went even further in its deference to school authorities in
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.115 In Kuhlmeier, a school
newspaper produced as part of a journalism class was going to publish,
with the approval of its faculty advisor, stories about three students'
experiences with pregnancy and about the impact of divorce on
students.116 No student's name was included in the article on pregnancy
and one was mentioned in the article on divorce (although it had been
deleted after the paper had been forwarded to the principal for
review). 1 7 Prior to publication, the paper went to the school principal
for final review. 118 The principal decided to publish the paper without
these articles by deleting the two pages on which they appeared. 19 The
principal expressed the view that the articles on pregnancy discussed
sexual activity and birth control in a manner that were inappropriate for
some of the younger students at the school. 120 Further, he reasoned that
the three students in the article on pregnancy might be identified from
other aspects of the article and that the parents of the student identified
in the article about divorce should have the opportunity to respond.
12
The students claimed the principal's actions violated their right to free
speech. 12
2
The Supreme Court upheld the principal's decision and rejected the
First Amendment challenge. 123 At the outset, Justice White, writing for
the Court, quoted Tinker, explaining that "[s]tudents in the public
112. Id. at 680.
113. Id. at 683.
114. Id. at 685-86.
115. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 260.
116. Id. at 263.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 264.
120. Id. at 263.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 264.
123. Id. at 266.
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schools do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate."' 124  Quoting Bethel, however, he
then added that the "First Amendment rights of students in the public
schools 'are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in
other settings."' 125 Justice White concluded that the school newspaper
was a nonpublic forum and that as a result "school officials were
entitled to regulate the contents of [the school newspaper] in any
reasonable manner."' 126 The Court emphasized the ability of schools to
control curricular decisions, such as what appears in school newspapers
published as part of journalism classes. 127 Justice White wrote:
The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to
tolerate particular student speech-the question that we addressed in
Tinker-is different from the question whether the First Amendment
requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech.
The former question addresses educators' ability to silence a student's
personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises.
The latter question concerns educators' authority over school-
sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive
activities that students, parents, and members of the public might
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school. 128
The Court said that in this context schools have broad authority to
regulate student speech. 129  The cases discussed above effectively
deconstitutionalize the First Amendment in the context of schools by
declaring there will be great judicial deference to school administrator's
decisions. 130 Lower courts have followed this lead and have
consistently sided with the schools and ruled against free speech claims
of students. 1
3 1
124. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cnty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
125. Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. V. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
126. Id. at 270 (citation omitted).
127. Id.
128. Id. at270-71.
129. Id. at 271.
130. See supra notes 108-129 and accompanying text (reviewing the Court's failure to protect
the First Amendment rights of students).
131. See, e.g., LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that school's
expulsion of student for writing poem with violent imagery involving the shooting deaths of
fellow students did not violate the First Amendment); Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dep't, 263 F.
Supp. 2d 195-206 (D. Mass. 2003) (finding school's actions were reasonable and did not violate
the First Amendment when officials sent student home for writing "I want to die" on a piece of
paper and drawing pictures of the school superintendent with explosives at his feet and a gun
pointed at his head).
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D. Other Constitutional Rights of Students
Another example of the deconstitutionalization of education concerns
the Fourth Amendment. 132 In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Supreme Court
held that schools could search students without meeting the probable
cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 133 The Court held that
special disciplinary needs exist in the school context and that adherence
to the warrant requirement "would unduly interfere with the
maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in
the schools."' 34  The Court expressly proclaimed the need to defer to
the authority and expertise of the schools, declaring that "strict
adherence to the requirement that searches be based upon probable
cause" would undercut "the substantial need of teachers and
administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools.' ' 135
The Court diminished Fourth Amendment protections in schools even
further in cases involving drug testing of students. 136  In Vernonia
School District v. Acton, the Supreme Court approved random drug
testing for high school athletes. 137 In Acton, an Oregon school district
required that all student athletes submit to drug testing before the school
year and subsequent random tests during the school year. 138 Justice
Scalia, writing for the Court, found that the program did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. 139  The Court stressed that students have a
relatively minimal privacy interest, especially when compared to the
schools' significant interest in stopping the use of illegal drugs. 140 The
Court expressed the need for deference to schools saying: "When the
government acts as guardian and tutor the relevant question is whether
the search is one that a reasonable guardian and tutor might
undertake."' 141 In other words, schools are allowed to violate the Fourth
Amendment's basic requirement of individualized suspicion. The
Court's deference to the authority and expertise of schools is
132. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides for "[tihe right of the
people... against unreasonable searches and seizures... and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause." Id.
133. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 347 (1985).
134. Id. at 340.
135. Id. at 341.
136. See infra notes 137-149 and accompanying text (describing the Court's approval of drug
testing programs in high school).
137. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
138. Id. at 648.
139. Id. at 664-65.
140. Id. at 657,661.
141. Id. at 665.
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controlling. 142
The Court went even further in Board of Education of Pottowatamie
School District v. Earls, by upholding a school program that required
random drug testing of all students who wanted to participate in
extracurricular activities, even non-competitive ones. 143  In Acton, the
testing was limited to student athletes and the Court had stressed the
risks of injury to drug impaired students participating in sports
events.144 Also in Acton, the school documented a serious drug problem
among its students. 145 In Earls, however, the Oklahoma school district
offered no such proof, and said that its goal was preventing drug use
among students. 1
46
The Supreme Court, in the 5-4 Earls decision, accepted this rationale
and held that the drug testing did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
147
Justice Thomas's opinion for the Court stressed the important interest of
schools in preventing drug use and the minimal invasion of privacy
from random drug tests. 148  Justice Thomas's reasoning would leave
virtually no protection for students' Fourth Amendment rights in
schools. Indeed, it appears, at least under Justice Thomas's majority
opinion, that schools can impose drug testing as if there were no Fourth
Amendment. 149  The denial of Fourth Amendment protections to
142. See id. (holding that the school's policy was reasonable and constitutional but noting that
"suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional muster in other contexts. The most
significant element ... is ... that the Policy was undertaken in furtherance of the government's
responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its
care").
143. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 839 (2002).
144. Acton, 515 U.S. at 649.
145. id.
146. Earls, 536 U.S. at 836.
147. Id. at 838.
148. Id. at 836-37.
149. See id. at 828-38 (explaining how Fourth Amendment rights differ, and are significantly
less, in a public school setting). Justice Thomas began his opinion by noting that the Fourth
Amendment requirement for probable cause before conducting a search is particularly intended
for criminal settings. Id. at 828. Ordinarily in civil settings, this individualized suspicion
standard is impracticable where the government reasonably "seeks to prevent the development of
hazardous conditions." Id. (quoting Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667-68
(1989)). Justice Thomas reiterated that "the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible
requirement of [individualized] suspicion." Id. at 829 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976)). Thus, Justice Thomas set the stage to uphold suspicionless mandatory
drug testing in public schools and to reject the student's claim that at least some level of
individualized suspicion was necessary for drug testing.
In analyzing the specific facts of the case, Justice Thomas found that a public school's
responsibility for maintaining discipline, health, and safety significantly outweighed the nature of
a student's privacy interest. Id. at 830-31. "Securing order in the school environment sometimes
requires that students be subjected to greater controls than those appropriate for adults." Id. at
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students in school is a clear and powerful example of the
deconstitutionalization of education.
This deference to schools has been evident in other areas, such as in
determining what procedural due process is required in student
disciplinary matters.' 50  In Goss v. Lopez, the Court held that the
government must provide procedural due process when suspending
students from public schools. 151 Yet, just as the Supreme Court backed
away from Tinker and its protection of speech in schools, so did the
Court minimize the application of due process in education. 15 2
In Ingraham v. Wright, the Court held that the imposition of corporal
punishment involved a deprivation of liberty, but did not require that the
school provide any type of due process prior to its imposition. 5 3 The
Court recognized that liberty includes "freedom from bodily restraint
and punishment" and therefore where school authorities "deliberately
decide to punish a child for misconduct by restraining the child and
inflicting appreciable physical pain,. . . Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interests are implicated.' 15 4
Yet the Court refused to require that the school provide any
procedures with regard to the imposition of corporal punishment.'55
The Court stated it was sufficient for due process that the state provided
tort law remedies against abuses. 156 The Court emphasized: "Hearings,
even informal hearings require time, personnel, and a diversion of
attention from normal school pursuits. School authorities may well
choose to abandon corporal punishment rather than incur the burdens of
complying with the procedural requirements.' '157 The Court stressed the
need for judicial deference to school authorities: "Assessment of the
831. Thus, students in public schools had a limited expectation of privacy. Id. at 832. Justice
Thomas then found that the confidentiality and method of collecting urine samples rendered the
school's policy minimally intrusive. Id. at 834. Finally, the overwhelming drug epidemic among
young people was a legitimate interest for schools to conduct base-less mandatory drug testing.
id. at 835-37.
150. See infra notes 151-158 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations on due
process rights in public schools under Goss and Ingraham).
151. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975).
152. See id. at 582, 584 (finding that in the public school context, due process does not always
require notice before inflicting punishment and, when notice is required, an informal discussion
will suffice).
153. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672, 682 (1977). The Court also held the imposition
of corporal punishment was not cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 683.
154. Id. at 674.
155. Id. at 682.
156. Id. at 672.
157. Id. at 680.
[Vol. 36
2004] The Deconstitutionalization of Education
need for, and the appropriate means of maintaining, school discipline is
committed generally to the discretion of school authorities subject to
state law."' 1
58
The one area where the Court has been willing to apply the
Constitution in schools concerns the Establishment Clause. 159  For
example, the Court has consistently held that prayer in public schools
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.1 60 In Santa
Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the Court held that student-
delivered prayers at high school football games are unconstitutional.
161
Likewise, in Lee v. Weisman, the Court held that clergy-delivered
prayers at public school graduations violate the Establishment
Clause. 162  This enforcement of the First Amendment in schools,
however, stands in marked contrast to the failure to apply so much else
of the Constitution in education.
III. THE UNDESIRABILITY OF THE
DECONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF EDUCATION
I believe that the decisions described above are undesirable in two
senses. First, the federal courts are abdicating their proper role under
the Constitution to enforce the fundamental rights of children in
schools. Second, the rulings are undesirable in their social effects:
increased segregation, continued inequality of school funding,
suppressed student speech, and lost privacy rights for students. 163
158. Id. at681-82.
159. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
160. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 316 (2000) (finding that the
announcement of a prayer before football games, even though elected by a majority of students,
"empowers the student body majority with the authority to subject students of minority to
constitutionally improper messages" and that this "power alone, regardless of the students'
ultimate use of it, is not acceptable"); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598-99 (1992) (holding that
a school cannot compel a student to participate in a religious exercise, where a public school had
clergy give a religious prayer at graduation ceremonies, and finding that "[tihe prayer exercises in
this case are especially improper because the State has in every practical sense compelled
attendance and participation in an explicit religious exercise at an event of singular importance to
every student, one the objecting student had no real alternative to avoid").
161. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 316.
162. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 599.
163. See generally, Bruce J. Biddle & David C. Berliner, A Research Synthesis/Unequal
School Funding in the United States, 59 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 8, 48-59 (May 2002) (compiling
statistics from many sources to show the trends that schools that have more minorities are
generally in impoverished areas and receive inadequate funding), available at
http://www.ascd.org/publications/ed-lead/200205/biddle.html; E RICA FRANKENBERG &
CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY, RACE IN AMERICAN
PUBLIC SCHOOLS: RAPIDLY RESEGREGATING SCHOOL DISTRICTS (August 2002) (scrutinizing
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As to the former, the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary have an
essential role to play in enforcing the Constitution's protections,
especially in contexts where the political branches are unlikely to do so.
This philosophy -deference to the political branches of government in
some areas, but the need for aggressive judicial review in others-was
expressed in a very famous footnote in United States v. Carolene
Products Co.164 In footnote four, the Court declared:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments.... It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation
which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be
subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment .... Nor need we
[i]nquire... whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry. 165
In other words, courts generally should presume that laws are
constitutional. As the Court has noted, a "more searching judicial
inquiry" is appropriate when a law interferes with individual rights,
restricts the ability of the political process to repeal undesirable
data of public schools at the district level to evaluate the trend toward resegregation and its effect
on minorities other than African-Americans), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/reseg-schools02.php; Libero Della
Piana, Reading, Writing, Race & Resegregation: 45 Years After Brown v. Board of Education, 2
COLORLINES I (Spring 1999) (citing GARY ORFIELD, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE
QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1997) as stating that current segregation
of schools now surpasses the levels of segregation that existed before Brown), at
http://www.arc.org/CLines/CLArchive/story2-1Ol.html; GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE,
THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY, BROWN AT 50: KING'S DREAM OR
PLESSY'S NIGHTMARE? (January 2004) (compiling and analyzing statistics to show that despite
minority growth in wealthier areas, minority students are still, and increasingly, attending
primarily minority schools and showing that this is not what should have resulted from the Brown
decision), a v a il able a t http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/
reseg04/resegregationO4.php; and, Patricia Macias Rojas & Rebecca Gordon, Just Facts: Racial
Resegregation and Inequality in the Public Schools, 2 COLORLINES I (May 1999) (compiling
statistics to show the disparity in funding between schools which are predominantly white, with
the minimal funding received by schools that are predominantly minority), at http://
www.arc.org/C Lines/CLArchive/story2_ 1 _O1.html.
164. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). For excellent
discussion of this footnote and its significance, see generally J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw.
U. L. REV. 275 (1989); and, Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV.
4, 713 (1985).
165. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
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legislation, or discriminates against a "discrete and insular minority." 166
It is a framework that provides general judicial deference to the
legislature but requires more intensive judicial review in particular
areas.
The enforcement of basic constitutional rights in schools fits exactly
within the areas where the Carolene Products footnote justifies
heightened review because the infringement of fundamental rights
secured by the Bill of Rights, as well as a "discrete and insular minority
exist." The discrete and insular minority concept protects groups that
are unlikely to rely on the political process for adequate protection.
Aggressive judicial review, therefore, is justified because insular
minority groups cannot trust the other branches of government. 1
67
Racial minorities are the classic insular minority. The reality is that
the political process never has worked-and I fear never will-to
desegregate schools. It is impossible to think of any politician in recent
years who has made school segregation an issue. Nor is the political
process going to achieve the equalization of funding for schools. Those
with the greatest political power benefit from the inequality, or at the
very least are unaffected by it as they can send their children to private
schools.168  Families with children in inadequately funded public
schools lack the political power to do anything about ensuring equal
educational opportunity.
Nor do students have political power to protect their First or Fourth
Amendment rights through the political process. For student rights,
courts must take action or there will be no protections at all.
Unfortunately, the reality over the past quarter of a century has been the
latter. 169
My objection, of course, is not solely at the process level. What is
particularly troubling is the result of the Supreme Court's
deconstitutionalization of education. American public education is
separate and unequal, and as discussed above, becoming ever more
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Ann Scales, Memo to Democrats: Black Vote Isn't Secure, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 10, 1998 (noting black voter outrage at Jeremiah Nixon -then-Missouri Attorney General
and 1998 Democratic candidate for the United States Senator-following Nixon's proposal to end
state aid for desegregation). While Nixon is still Attorney General in Missouri, his Senate bid
failed and Republican Christopher Bond was re-elected by a wide margin. See MO US Senate at
http://www.ourcampaigns.com/cgi-bin/r.cgi/RaceDetail.html?&RacelD=3805 (last visited Oct.
20, 2004) (detailing 1998 Senate election results).
168. See supra note 6 (discussing the prep school backgrounds of recent presidential
candidates).
169. See supra Part II (explaining how the Court has increasingly limited students'
constitutional rights over the years).
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so. 170 The reality is that the average African-American or Latino
student receives a very different education than the average white
student in the United States. 171  The promise of Brown's equal
educational opportunity has not been realized and will not be as long as
the deconstitutionalization of education continues. People can devise
accepting rationalizations: that courts could not really succeed; that
desegregation does not matter; and that parents of minority students do
not really care about desegregation. 172  But none of these
rationalizations are true. Brown was right: Separate schools can never
be equal.
IV. CONCLUSION
Why has this country failed to live up to Brown's promise and its
mandate? In part, it is a lack of political will. No President since
Lyndon Johnson has proposed steps to deal with segregation in housing
or schools. No Congress has attempted to deal with the problem.
Neither candidate for the 2004 presidential election proposed any way
to deal with segregation. 173 There just is not the political will, and there
never has been, to deal with segregated unequal schools through the
legislative process.
Unfortunately, the courts have failed us too. In a series of decisions,
the Supreme Court has essentially deconstitutionalized education. 174 As
170. See supra note 163 (providing examples and studies of how the trend in American
schools has increasingly become more unequal both racially and monetarily).
171. See supra Parts II.A and II.B (discussing racial segregation and funding disparities,
respectively).
172. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public Education:
The Court's Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1622 (2003) (arguing that the Supreme Court "seems
intent on declaring victory over the problem of school segregation and withdrawing the judiciary
from solving the problem," which results in interested citizens seeking rationalizations for the
failure of desegregation). See Brown v. Board of Education: A Moot Court Argument, 52 AM. U.
L. REV. 1343, 1369 (2003) (detailing that during a mock re-argument of Brown, Prof. Derrick
Bell of New York University Law School "predicts" that if desegregation were ordered, short
term enthusiasm for Brown would be replaced by a longer-term loss of interest in desegregation
issues); Bradley W. Joondeph, Missouri v. Jenkins and the De Facto Abandonment of Court
Enforced Desegregation, 71 WASH. L. REV. 597, 653 (1996) (arguing that recent decisions are
harbingers of the end of courts acting as the mechanism for school desegregation); Lifting
"Desegregation Court" Orders, Where Winning Isn't Always a Victory, Issues and Views (June
1, 2001) (noting that some black parents would rather focus on high-quality academics as
opposed to bussing to achieve desegregation goals), at http://www.issues-
views.com/index.php/sect/1003/article/1039.
173. See Bush and Kerry Mark Desegregation in Topeka, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2004
(recapping each politician's comments during their brief visit to Topeka, Kansas, in
commemoration of the 50th anniversary of Brown, whereby each politician acknowledged that
racism still exists and that the government needs to act to rectify this problem).
174. See supra Part II (detailing the major cases which effectively limited student rights in
The Deconstitutionalization of Education
described above, constitutional guarantees of equal protection, freedom
of speech, protection from unreasonable search and seizure, and
procedural due process all have been deemed to have little application
in schools. 175
Equal educational opportunity can be achieved. But living up to the
legacy and promise of Brown will require effort and courage by
politicians and courts that has yet to be shown. For far too long, the
problem of separate and unequal schools has been ignored. The fiftieth
anniversary of Brown should be the occasion for more than a
celebration of that decision; it must be the time for making its promise a
reality.
public schools under the Constitution).
175. See supra Part II (discussing the application, or lack thereof, of constitutional principals
in the public schools).
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